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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss some of the major issues affecting the design of an outpatient prescription
drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries.  Those design issues pose some difficult
choices among desirable, but potentially conflicting, objectives.  Moreover, they need
to be considered in the context of the growing financial pressures facing the
Medicare program.
I will emphasize several points about the Medicare program and proposals to
establish a new prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries:
 The Medicare program faces increasing costs, particularly after 2010 as the
baby boomers become eligible for benefits.  Medicare will become more and
more dependent on general revenues and, ultimately, will be unsustainable in
its current form.
 Medicare does not provide the protection offered by most private insurance,
since it lacks coverage for prescription drugs and does not provide insurance
protection against the consequences of very costly episodes of illness.
 Most Medicare beneficiaries have supplemental insurance that covers some
of their out-of-pocket costs for medical services.  However, nearly a third of
the Medicare population had no prescription drug coverage in 1997.
 The cost of a Medicare drug benefit would depend primarily on the
comprehensiveness of the benefit and the generosity of governmental
subsidies.  The way in which a drug benefit is administered could also affect
its cost.
 Stop-loss coverage would protect beneficiaries from extremely high expenses
for prescription drugs, but few people spend more than the typical stop-loss
amount.  In contrast, most Medicare beneficiaries have some drug spending
during the year and would receive some benefit from a program that offered
coverage above a nominal deductible amount.
 Subsidies would help make a Medicare drug benefit more affordable for low-
income beneficiaries.  In general, a more comprehensive benefit would reduce
federal costs for a low-income subsidy (including offsetting changes in
Medicaid spending) because Medicare would be paying for a larger portion
of drug spending.  However, a more comprehensive benefit would also raise
total federal costs.

1. That statement reflects CBO’s May  2001 projections of baseline spending.
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PROJECTIONS OF MEDICARE SPENDING UNDER CURRENT LAW
The growth of Medicare spending has been much slower in the past few years than
it has been historically.  In fiscal years 1998 through 2001, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that benefit payments will grow at an average annual rate of
3.1 percent, compared with 10.0 percent per year over the previous decade.1
CBO further estimates that Medicare will spend $237 billion on benefits for 40
million elderly and disabled people in fiscal year 2001.  Despite the recent slowdown
in spending growth, that amount is almost 25 percent more than Medicare spent five
years ago.   The program now accounts for about 13 percent of estimated total federal
spending, or 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
Moreover, CBO is projecting faster Medicare growth over the next decade.  We
estimate that Medicare spending will more than double—reaching $499 billion—by
fiscal year 2011, reflecting an average increase of 7.9 percent per year (see Figure 1).
At that rate, Medicare spending in 2011 will constitute 19 percent of the federal
budget, assuming that no change occurs in current tax and spending policies.  In fact,
the program will account for 36 percent of the projected increase in federal spending
by the end of the decade.
3LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS
Medicare spending occurs under two separate programs, the Hospital Insurance (HI)
program, or Part A, and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program, or
Part B.  HI spending will total an estimated $138 billion in fiscal year 2001, paying
for inpatient hospital care, some stays in skilled nursing facilities, some home health
care, and hospice services.  SMI spending this year is projected to reach almost $100
billion, paying for services from physicians and outpatient care facilities, as well as
medical supplies and home health benefits.  
The HI program is primarily financed by the Medicare payroll tax and the portion of
income taxes on Social Security benefits that is earmarked for the HI trust fund.  The
SMI program is financed mainly from general revenues that cover about 75 percent
of SMI costs, with the rest covered by monthly premiums paid by enrollees.  It should
be noted that 87 percent of total Medicare revenues in 2001 come from taxes paid by
current workers; current Medicare beneficiaries pay the other 13 percent through SMI
premiums and income taxes on Social Security benefits.
The latest report from the Medicare Board of Trustees indicates that estimated total
income to the HI trust fund will exceed estimated outlays by $29.8 billion in fiscal
year 2001.  But $12.6 billion of that amount comes from interest on the trust fund's
assets and from other miscellaneous sources.   If just the tax revenues dedicated to
the HI trust fund were counted against the fund’s outlays, its estimated surplus this
year would be only $17.2 billion.
2That change is consistent with the one that CBO applied in its most recent report
(October 2000) on The Long-Term Budget Outlook.
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The Medicare trustees also report that under their intermediate assumptions, the HI
trust fund's expenses will exceed its dedicated revenues beginning in 2016.  By 2030,
the revenues dedicated to the HI trust fund will equal only 66 percent of costs; by
2075, that ratio will be only 32 percent.
Those data do not take into account Medicare’s SMI program, which is growing
more rapidly than the HI program.  As recently as 1997, HI benefit payments
constituted 66 percent of total Medicare benefit payments.  As of 2001, that
proportion had declined to 58 percent, and CBO projects that it will decline to 53
percent by fiscal year 2011.  Some of that change is due to the movement of home
health care from HI to SMI according to the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997; that change increases the estimated balance in the HI trust fund in fiscal year
2011 by about $240 billion.  The shift further blurs an already hazy distinction
between the two programs.
The Medicare trustees' report projects that total Medicare spending will increase from
2.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 4.5 percent in 2030 and 8.5 percent in 2075.  Those
numbers reflect a change in the trustees’ assumptions from last year, following the
recommendation of their panel of experts that they raise their projection of long-term
growth in Medicare spending per beneficiary.2
The mounting financial pressure on the Medicare program is highlighted by the large
and growing difference between projected total Medicare spending and the total
amount of federal revenues specifically dedicated to the program, including the
5Medicare payroll tax on current workers, the portion of the income taxes on Social
Security benefits that are paid to the HI trust fund, and premiums paid by enrollees
for SMI.  To fund total Medicare expenditures, the difference would be made up of
other taxes on current workers.
According to the Medicare trustees, the discrepancy between total Medicare
expenditures and dedicated revenues will be $64 billion in 2001, or 0.6 percent of
GDP (see Figure 2).  By 2011, that gap is projected to rise to $139 billion, or 0.8
percent of GDP.  That amount would represent 30 percent of Medicare’s gross
outlays, up from 26 percent in 2001.  By 2075, that gap is projected to grow to 6.0
percent of GDP.
Beyond the next decade, use of Medicare-covered services is expected to accelerate.
Medicare enrollment, which has increased at a rate of about 1 percent a year over the
past 10 years and is expected to grow somewhat faster over the next decade, will rise
even more rapidly as the baby-boom generation begins to retire in 2011.  According
to the Medicare trustees, there will be 77 million beneficiaries in 2030—an increase
of more than 90 percent over this year's enrollment.  In addition, as technology
advances, more services will be available for use by more patients, and those services
will be more costly.
At the same time, the number of workers whose taxes provide the bulk of Medicare's
revenues will not keep pace with the growing number of beneficiaries.  While the
number of beneficiaries in 2030 will be more than 90 percent greater than it is now,
the number of workers paying into Medicare will be only about 15 percent greater.
6As a result, the ratio of covered workers to Medicare beneficiaries is expected to fall
from 4.0 to 2.3.  Correspondingly, Medicare HI spending as a percentage of taxable
payroll is expected to rise from 2.7 percent in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2030 and to 10.7
percent by 2075 (see Figure 3).
These financial pressures have focused policymakers’ attention on the issue of
long-term reform of the Medicare program.  Efforts to reform Medicare have focused
both on improving the efficiency and financial viability of the program and on
modernizing the benefit package, specifically to include prescription drug coverage.
Adding a prescription drug benefit could close a significant gap in program coverage
but only at a sizable cost to the federal government or to enrollees.  Because of the
long-term financing pressure facing Medicare, careful consideration needs to be
given to the benefit package, cost sharing between the government and enrollees, and
the design features of any new benefit.  
PROVIDING MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH COVERAGE
FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Prescription drug spending by Medicare enrollees has grown rapidly in recent years
and is likely to continue to do so.  Although Medicare does not now have a
prescription drug benefit, most enrollees have some drug coverage, but  that coverage
varies widely.  The cost of a Medicare drug benefit depends on the decisions made
about the structure, financing, and administration of the new benefit.
7Baseline Projections of Beneficiaries' Spending on Prescription Drugs
In recent years, growth in prescription drug spending has far outpaced growth in
spending for other types of health care.  Those rising expenditures have had a
significant impact not only on Medicare beneficiaries but on employers who offer
retiree health coverage and on state governments as well. 
Between 1990 and 2000, annual spending on prescription drugs in the United States
grew nearly twice as fast as that for total national health expenditures, and it has
maintained a double-digit pace since the mid-1990s.  For the U.S. population as a
whole, three factors explain most of that growth:  the introduction of new and costlier
drug treatments, broader use of prescription drugs by a larger number of people, and
lower cost-sharing requirements by private health plans.  Within some therapeutic
classes, new brand-name drugs tend to be much costlier than older drug therapies,
which has also contributed to growth in spending.  Use of prescription drugs has
broadened as well, because many new drugs provide better treatment or have fewer
side effects than older alternatives and more people are aware of new drug therapies
through the "direct to consumer" advertising campaigns of pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Even without a Medicare drug benefit, CBO expects prescription drug costs for
Medicare enrollees to grow at a rapid pace over the next decade (see Table 1).  At an
average annual rate of 10.3 percent per beneficiary, drug costs are expected to rise
at almost twice the pace of combined costs for Medicare’s HI and SMI programs, and
much faster than growth in the nation’s economy.  (CBO’s estimates of rising drug
8spending are based on the latest projections for prescription drug costs within the
national health accounts.)
CBO’s baseline estimate of prescription drug costs for Medicare enrollees is up
significantly over last year’s because of higher projections of the rate of growth in per
capita drug costs.  Last year’s analysis indicated that spending by Medicare enrollees
on outpatient drugs not covered by Medicare would total $1.1 trillion over the period
2001 through 2010 (see Table 2).  This year, our projection for the same period is
$1.3 trillion, or about 18 percent higher.
Our estimate for 2002 through 2011, the current 10-year projection period, is roughly
$1.5 trillion—which is about 33 percent higher than last year’s projection for 2001
through 2010.  The jump results from assuming a higher growth rate and replacing
an early low-cost year (2001) with a late high-cost year (2011).
Those changes to CBO’s baseline estimate—higher per capita drug spending and the
inclusion of a new high-cost year in the projection window—imply that proposals for
a prescription drug benefit will have higher price tags than they did last year.  But for
any given proposal, the exact magnitude of the difference between CBO’s estimate
for last year and its estimate for this year will also depend on the bill’s specific
features.
CBO projects that spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries on prescription drugs
will total $104 billion in calendar year 2004—the first year in which Medicare could
probably begin to implement a new benefit (see Table 3).  In that year, nearly 60
percent of Medicare beneficiaries will spend $1,000 or more on prescription drugs.
9Enrollee spending above $1,000 is projected to total $72 billion in 2004, constituting
about 70 percent of total drug spending by or for all Medicare enrollees.  Only about
13 percent of enrollees will spend $5,000 or more on prescription drugs in that year.
Spending at or above that threshold would total about $18 billion in 2004.
Existing Coverage
While third-party coverage for prescription drugs has become more generous over
time for the population as a whole, that trend is less clear for Medicare beneficiaries.
In 1997, nearly one-third of the Medicare population had no prescription drug
coverage.  On average, Medicare beneficiaries paid about 45 percent of their drug
expenditures out of pocket (see Figure 4).  By comparison, all people in the United
States paid an average of 39 percent of the cost of their prescriptions.  Because
Medicare beneficiaries are elderly or disabled, they are more likely to have chronic
health conditions and to use more prescription drugs:  nearly 89 percent filled at least
one prescription in 1997.  Medicare beneficiaries made up 14 percent of the
population that year, yet they accounted for about 40 percent of the $75 billion spent
on prescription drugs in the United States.
Those factors suggest that growth in drug spending has a larger financial impact on
the Medicare population than on other population groups.  However, aggregate
statistics mask a wide variety of personal circumstances.  Nearly 70 percent of
beneficiaries obtain drug coverage as part of a plan that supplements Medicare’s
benefits, but those supplemental plans vary significantly in their generosity.  
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Traditionally, more seniors have received prescription drug coverage from retiree
health plans than from any other source, and the plans’ benefits have been relatively
generous.  In 1997, about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries had supplemental
coverage through a current or former employer, and most of those plans provided
drug coverage (see Table 4).  Although specific benefits vary, it is common to find
relatively low deductibles and copayments in employer-sponsored drug plans.
However, because prescription drug spending by elderly retirees has become a
significant cost to employers, many have begun to restructure their benefits.  For
example, a 1997 Hewitt Associates’ study for the Kaiser Family Foundation found
that among large employers, drug spending for people age 65 or older made up 40
percent to 60 percent of the total cost of their retiree health plans.  Average utilization
of prescription drugs among elderly retirees was more than double that for active
workers.  Although relatively few employers in the Hewitt survey have dropped
retiree coverage altogether, most have taken steps to control costs, such as tightening
eligibility standards, requiring retirees to contribute more toward premiums, placing
caps on the amount of benefits that plans will cover, and encouraging elderly
beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans.
Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans are another means by which the elderly and disabled
have obtained prescription drug coverage.  In 2000, for example, 64 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries had access to M+C plans that offered some drug coverage,
although a significantly smaller fraction of elderly people signed up for those plans.
Many M+C plans have scaled back their drug benefits in response to rising costs and
slower growth in Medicare’s payment rates.  Nearly all such plans have annual caps
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on drug benefits for enrollees—many at a level of only $500 per year—and a
growing share of plans charge a premium for supplemental benefits.
While 26 percent of the Medicare population relied on individually purchased (often
medigap) plans as their sole form of supplemental coverage in 1997, less than half
of that group had policies that covered prescription drugs.  Medigap plans with drug
coverage tend to be much less generous than retiree health plans; medigap plans have
a deductible of $250, 50 percent coinsurance, and annual benefit limits of either
$1,250 or $3,000.  Premiums for plans that include drug coverage also tend to be
much higher than premiums for other medigap plans, due in part to their tendency to
attract enrollees who have higher-than-average health expenses.
Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries may also be eligible for Medicaid
coverage, which generally includes a prescription drug benefit.  All state Medicaid
programs offer prescription drug coverage (usually involving little or no cost sharing)
to people whose income and assets fall below certain thresholds.  In addition, as of
January 2001, 26 states had authorized (but had not necessarily yet implemented)
some type of pharmaceutical assistance program, most of which would provide direct
aid for purchases to low-income seniors who did not meet the Medicaid
requirements.  About 64 percent of the Medicare population lives in those states.
Thus, middle- and higher-income seniors can usually obtain coverage through retiree
or M+C plans, while seniors with the lowest income generally have access to state-
based drug benefit programs.   However, beneficiaries with income between one and
two times the poverty level are more likely to be caught in the middle, with incomes
or assets that are too large to qualify for state programs and less access than higher-
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income enrollees to drug coverage through former employers.  In 1997, more than a
quarter of Medicare enrollees had income between one and two times the poverty
level, but nearly 40 percent of them had no drug coverage (see Table 5).
Consequently, half of the drug spending for people in that income group was paid out
of pocket.  
Design Choices for a Medicare Drug Benefit
A Medicare drug benefit might address a number of objectives.  The most
fundamental would be to ensure that all beneficiaries had access to reasonable
coverage for outpatient prescription drug costs—but this fundamental notion allows
for considerable debate about what that would mean.  The various objectives that
might be thought desirable in the abstract are often mutually incompatible; as a result,
difficult choices must be made.   For example, it is not possible to provide a generous
drug benefit to all Medicare beneficiaries at low cost—either premiums paid by
enrollees or subsidies paid by taxpayers would be high.  If most of the costs were
paid by enrollees' premiums to keep federal costs low, some Medicare beneficiaries
would be unwilling or unable to participate in the program.  If costs were limited by
covering only catastrophic expenses, few enrollees would receive reimbursement for
drug costs in any given year, possibly reducing support for the program.  (Such
coverage, however, would provide insurance protection to those who enrolled.)  If,
instead, costs were limited by capping the annual benefits paid to each enrollee, the
program would fail to protect participants from the impact of catastrophic expenses.
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In designing a drug benefit, policymakers must make four fundamental decisions:
 Who may participate?
 How will program costs be financed?
 How comprehensive will coverage be?
 Who will administer the benefit and under what conditions?
Participation.  Although most Medicare enrollees use some prescription drugs, the
bulk of such spending is concentrated among a much smaller group.  In 1997, about
13 percent of enrollees had expenditures of $2,000 or more, accounting for 45
percent of total drug spending by the Medicare population.  Forty-six percent had
expenditures of $500 or less, making up about 8 percent of total spending.  Most
spending is associated with treatment of chronic conditions—such as hypertension,
cardiovascular disease, and diabetes.  The skewed distribution of spending and the
need for people with chronic conditions to stay on drug therapies over the long term
makes stand-alone drug coverage particularly susceptible to adverse selection, in
which enrollment is concentrated among those who expect to receive more in benefits
than they pay in premiums.   
Because of the likelihood of adverse selection, a premium-financed drug benefit
offered as a voluntary option for Medicare enrollees must restrict participation in
some way.  If Medicare beneficiaries were free to enroll in or leave the program at
will, only those who expected to gain from the benefit would participate each year.
That would drive premiums up, which would further reduce enrollment as enrollees
with below-average drug costs dropped out.
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Most of the drug benefit proposals developed in 2000 would have provided a
voluntary drug option, but they attempted to mitigate the potential for adverse
selection by one of two approaches:  either they gave enrollees only one opportunity
to choose the drug benefit, at the time enrollees first became eligible; or they imposed
an actuarially fair surcharge on premiums for those who delayed enrollment.  Another
approach to avoiding the problem of adverse selection would be to couple the drug
benefit with Part B of Medicare so that enrollees could choose either Part B plus a
drug benefit or no Part B and no drug benefit.  In that case, even if the drug portion
of the benefit was not heavily subsidized, the current 75 percent subsidy of Part B
benefits would ensure nearly universal participation in the coupled benefit. 
   
Financing.  Program costs could be entirely financed by enrollees’ premiums, or
some or all of the costs could be paid by federal taxpayers.  Given a one-time-only
enrollment option, participation rates would be reasonably high, even if the program
was largely financed by enrollees.  If given only a one-time option to enroll, most
beneficiaries would do so because virtually all of them would benefit from drug
coverage at some time during their lives.  The erosion now occurring in the
comprehensive coverage provided by private plans would also spur participation.
Further, employer-sponsored health plans would probably require that retirees
eligible for a new Medicare benefit participate in it, just as they now effectively
require that retirees participate in  Part B.  And state Medicaid agencies, even if not
mandated to do so, would choose to enroll dual eligibles (people eligible for both
Medicare and Medicaid) in a new Medicare drug benefit if their costs under the new
program were less than the cost of the drug benefits now provided under Medicaid.
However, if a generous drug benefit was fully financed by enrollees, premiums
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would be high, making the benefit difficult to afford for lower-income beneficiaries
ineligible for Medicaid.  The drug proposals developed last year would all provide
full subsidies to low-income people for both cost sharing and premiums, in addition
to partially subsidizing premiums for all other enrollees.
Coverage.  A Medicare drug benefit could be designed to look like the benefit
typically provided by employer-sponsored plans.  If so, it would be integrated with
the rest of the Medicare benefit.  Further, it would have cost-sharing requirements
that were low (ranging from 20 percent to 25 percent coinsurance or a copayment per
prescription of $10 to $25) and stop-loss protection—a dollar limit above which no
cost sharing would be required.  Such comprehensive coverage would provide good
protection for enrollees, but it would be very costly.  Not only would it increase
utilization among those who now have less-generous coverage, but it would also
transfer most of the costs of drugs currently used by enrollees to the Medicare
program.   
One way to constrain costs and utilization is by limiting coverage—covering only
catastrophic costs, for example, or imposing a cap on benefits paid per enrollee each
year.  If Medicare provided coverage only for catastrophic costs, most enrollees
would receive no benefit payments in any given year.  Nevertheless, it would be
inaccurate to say that those enrollees would receive no benefit, since they would be
protected against the possibility of catastrophic expenses—the main function of
insurance.
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Alternatively, policymakers could take the other approach to limiting costs:  covering
a portion of all drug costs but only up to a benefit cap.  However, because that
approach would not protect those enrollees who were most in need, most of last
year’s proposals included stop-loss protection. The end result was a benefit unlike
anything available in the private sector—a hybrid that had a capped benefit, then a
“hole” with no drug coverage, and finally a stop-loss provision, beyond which the
program would pay all drug costs (see Figure 5).  The larger the range of spending
encompassed by the hole, the less costly the program would be—but also the less
coverage the benefit would provide.    
An approach to limiting costs within the context of a more traditional benefit would
be to have a higher initial deductible amount, relatively high cost-sharing require-
ments, and a high stop-loss threshold.  Or the program could provide a more
generous benefit similar to those provided by employer-sponsored plans, with
taxpayer costs limited by financing most of the program’s costs through enrollees’
premiums.
Administration.  The way in which a drug benefit is administered can also have a
significant effect on how costly it is.  All recent proposals have envisioned adopting
the now common private-sector approach of using pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs) in each region.  Proposals have differed, however, in whether only one or
several PBMs would serve a region, in whether the responsible entities would assume
any insurance risk, and in the kind of restrictions that would be placed on them.  
Private health plans use PBMs to process claims and negotiate price discounts with
drug manufacturers and dispensing pharmacies.  PBMs also try to steer beneficiaries
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toward lower-cost drugs, such as generic, preferred formulary, or mail-order drugs.
In addition, because of their centralized records for each enrollee's prescriptions, they
can help prevent adverse drug interactions.  The likelihood that PBMs could
effectively constrain costs depends on their having both the authority and the
incentive to aggressively use the various cost-control mechanisms at their disposal.
In the private sector, PBMs often have considerable leeway in the tools they can use,
but they do not assume any insurance risk for the drug benefit.  At most, they may be
subject to a bonus or a penalty added to their administrative fee, based on how well
they meet prespecified goals for their performance.  
Some of the proposals developed last year (such as the one developed by the Clinton
Administration) adopted the typical private-sector model, with a single PBM selected
periodically to serve each region and with all insurance risk borne by Medicare, not
the PBM.   There are two main concerns about that model:  it might prove politically
difficult to allow the designated PBMs to use cost-control tools aggressively if
enrollees have no choice of provider in each region, and non-risk-bearing PBMs
might have too little incentive to use strong tools, even if they were permitted.
Other proposals (such as the Breaux-Frist bills and the drug bill passed by the House)
adopted a different model, more akin to the risk-based competitive model
characteristic of Medicare+Choice plans.  Those proposals envisioned multiple risk-
bearing entities (such as PBM/insurer partners) that would compete to serve enrollees
in each region.  Enrollees would have some choice among providers so that
beneficiaries who were willing to accept more-restrictive rules (such as a closed
formulary) in return for lower premium costs could do so, while others could select
a more expensive provider with fewer restrictions.  If the entities bore all of the
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insurance risk for the drug benefit, they would have strong incentives to use whatever
cost-control tools were permitted.  However, they would also have strong incentives
to try to achieve favorable selection by avoiding enrollees most in need of coverage.
One of the concerns raised about this model was that no entities might be willing to
participate if they had to assume the full insurance risk for a stand-alone drug benefit.
To mitigate that concern, the proposals included federally provided reinsurance for
high-cost enrollees.  (Reinsurance means that the federal government, and ultimately
taxpayers, share part or all of the costs of high-cost enrollees.)  However, reinsurance
would tend to weaken the plans' incentives to control costs.  Another concern was
that differences among plans in benefit structures or strategies for cost control could
result in some plans attracting low-cost enrollees and others attracting more costly
enrollees.  The risk of that kind of selection would lead plans to raise the cost of the
benefit.  Moreover, to avoid such risks, plans would, over time, come to offer
benefits that were very similar in design.
The Cost of Covering Prescription Drugs for Medicare Enrollees
There are numerous design parameters that must be specified in developing a
Medicare prescription drug benefit, and decisions concerning those parameters can
greatly affect the benefit’s cost to the taxpayer and to the beneficiary.  This testimony
provides some examples of how costs would be affected by varying certain aspects
of the benefit’s design.
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The estimates that follow are approximate and subject to change; the cost of a
detailed proposal would vary depending on its precise specifications.  The estimates
are for 2004 only.
Base Case.
  For purposes of this testimony, the base case is a benefit that provides
coverage for all of the outpatient drug costs of Medicare enrollees (see Table 6).  The
enrollee would be responsible for coinsurance equal to 50 percent of the cost of
prescription drugs up to $8,000 of total spending.  The new benefit would cover the
entire cost of drugs above that amount.  Thus, the enrollee would be liable for up to
$4,000 in out-of-pocket spending before reaching the stop-loss amount.
To pay for this program, enrollees would be charged a monthly premium designed
to cover 50 percent of the cost of the benefit.  The federal government would pay for
the other 50 percent.  In conjunction with several administrative features, we assume
that a subsidy of that size would be sufficient to ensure that all enrollees in Part B of
Medicare would participate in the prescription drug program.
Low-income enrollees would receive a subsidy to enable them to participate in the
Medicare drug program.  Enrollees with income up to 135 percent of the federal
poverty level would receive a full subsidy of premiums and cost sharing.  Those with
income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty level would receive a
premium subsidy (on a sliding scale that declined with income) but would be
responsible for any cost sharing.  States and the federal government would share in
those subsidy costs for enrollees with income of less than 100 percent of the poverty
level and for those who were dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.  The federal
government would cover 100 percent of the cost for people who qualified for the
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drug benefit’s low-income subsidies but did not meet their state’s eligibility criteria
for Medicaid benefits.
The base case also assumes that a single PBM would administer the program in each
region, with all insurance risk borne by Medicare.  The cases presented in this
testimony do not consider another major alternative for delivering a Medicare drug
benefit:  instead of a single PBM, the program could be operated through multiple
risk-bearing entities who would compete for enrollees.  Competing PBM/insurer
partners who bore insurance risk would have a strong incentive to use tools such as
restrictive formularies and three-tier copayment structures to aggressively manage
costs.  However, they would also incur certain "load" costs—such as marketing
expenses to attract enrollees and a premium for accepting insurance risk—that a
single PBM would not.  The net impact on program costs would depend on the
specific details of the proposal.
The benefit design assumed for the base case would cost the federal government
about $30.9 billion in 2004.  The Medicare benefit portion of that total is $26.5
billion, and the low-income subsidy (and interactions with the Medicaid program)
account for the remaining $4.3 billion (see Table 7).  As we will see in comparisons
with other cases, a less generous drug benefit would decrease Medicare costs but
increase the cost of the low-income subsidy.
In the aggregate, enrollees would pay a total of $26.5 billion in premiums, reflecting
a monthly premium of $56.80 that they would pay under the base case plan.  That
total includes premiums that are paid on behalf of low-income enrollees through the
low-income subsidy.  In addition, enrollees would face about $44.5 billion in cost
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sharing for the prescription drugs that they used.  Again, that amount includes some
cost sharing that would be picked up by supplemental payers, including
employer-sponsored insurance and medigap plans.  As we will demonstrate below,
a less generous benefit would lower premiums but raise the amount of cost sharing
paid by enrollees. 
Federal costs could be reduced by imposing more cost sharing on enrollees or by
varying other aspects of the design.  The following discussion of alternative cases
examines how the costs imposed on taxpayers and beneficiaries would change if one
or more features of the program were varied.
Change Beneficiaries’ Cost Sharing.
  The overall federal cost of a prescription drug
proposal would fall if beneficiaries were responsible for a greater share of program
costs.  Higher cost sharing would, of course, increase the cost of the low-income
subsidy.
Case 1-A is identical to the base case except for a $250 annual deductible.  Nearly 89
percent of enrollees have some prescription drug spending during the year and would
thus be liable for at least part of the deductible.  Including a deductible would lower
Medicare costs but raise low-income costs compared with the base case.  On balance,
the federal cost of the program would fall to $28.7 billion in 2004, and monthly
premiums would decline to $52.10.  Beneficiaries who had more than $250 in drug
spending that year would face higher costs under this option because the added cost
of the deductible would be only partly offset by the reduced premium.
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An even higher deductible would further reduce program costs.  Case 1-B imposes
a $500 deductible on the base case, and the federal cost drops to $26.9 billion in
2004.  Doubling the deductible amount from Case 1-A does not double savings from
the base case, however, because some enrollees who would pay the full $250
deductible would spend less than $500 on drugs in a year and thus would not pay the
full amount of the higher deductible.
Lowering the coinsurance rate could alter program costs dramatically.  The base case
assumes a 50 percent coinsurance rate, while Case 1-C lowers that rate to 25 percent.
That adjustment increases the program’s net federal cost by nearly 40 percent, to
$42.6 billion in 2004.  Medicare’s cost would increase to $38.4 billion, while the
low-income subsidy would fall to $4.1 billion.
The lower coinsurance would drive premiums upward as program costs rose.
Premiums would increase by nearly half, to $82.30 monthly.  In the aggregate,
beneficiaries would pay about $38.4 billion in premiums.  However, aggregate cost
sharing would decline precipitously as well, to nearly $25 billion.  While all enrollees
would face the higher premiums, the lower coinsurance rate would primarily benefit
enrollees with significant drug costs.
Raise the Stop-Loss Amount.
  The net federal program cost also could be reduced
by raising the stop-loss amount, although the additional financial exposure would
increase the cost of the low-income subsidy.  Under the base case, the stop-loss
amount is set at $4,000 paid out of pocket; a beneficiary who had used $8,000 in
covered prescription drugs and paid 50 percent coinsurance would not be liable for
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any additional costs incurred during the year.  (Enrollees who spend more than
$8,000 account for about 23 percent of total baseline spending in 2004.)
Case 2-A raises the stop-loss amount to $6,000 in out-of-pocket spending.  That
higher level is equivalent to total spending by an enrollee of $12,000, which will
account for less than 10 percent of total baseline spending in 2004.  Under this
option, the federal cost of the program would fall to $29.8 billion, a reduction of 3
percent from the base case.  The low-income subsidy rises to $4.4 billion compared
with the base case.  Total premiums fall to about $25 billion, and aggregate cost
sharing increases to nearly $47 billion.
Raising the stop-loss amount by an additional $2,000—to $8,000—lowers program
costs by less than the previous difference found in Case 2-A.  The federal cost for
Case 2-B is estimated to be $29.5 billion, or about 5 percent lower than the base case.
Cap Benefits.
  A third approach would place a limit on drug costs covered under the
Medicare benefit.  Case 3 would impose such a limit when the enrollee reached
$2,500 in total drug spending.  That is, the enrollee would receive up to $1,250 in
reimbursement for drug expenses before reaching the benefit cap.  Such a cap could
be absolute, with no additional reimbursement for spending at any level above the
cap.  However, Case 3 keeps the same stop-loss provision as in the base case so that
the beneficiary faces no cost sharing beyond $5,250 in total charges.  That structure
leaves a "hole" in covered spending—a range of prescription drug spending for
which most enrollees must pay all of their costs.  (Individuals with income below 135
percent of the poverty level, whose cost sharing is fully subsidized, would be
unaffected by this provision.)
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Relative to the base case, the limit on coverage in Case 3 would lower Medicare costs
but increase the low-income subsidy.  The net federal cost would total approximately
$27.0 billion in 2004.  The option’s benefit cap would also lower premiums to about
$22.5 billion and raise aggregate cost sharing to nearly $52 billion.  The lower
premiums under Case 3, compared with the base case, reflect a less generous benefit.
Combine Features.  The above options were designed to show how varying one
parameter of a prescription drug benefit would affect program costs.  This section
looks at alternatives that combine several changes at the same time.
Case 4-A combines the base case with many of the features described above:  a $250
deductible, benefits capped at $1,125 (after the enrollee reaches $2,500 in total drug
spending), and stop-loss protection after the beneficiary spends $6,000 out of pocket.
The costs of enrollees with income below 135 percent of the poverty level would be
fully subsidized inside the benefit "hole."
Such a benefit would be significantly less generous than the base case, but the costs
of financing it would be significantly lower as well.  In 2004, federal costs would be
approximately $21.5 billion, or about one-third less than the base case.  Likewise,
monthly premiums would fall from $56.80 under the base case to $35.90 under Case
4-A.  That causes total premiums to drop to $16.8 billion, with a corresponding
increase in aggregate cost sharing to $61.8 billion.
Case 4-B is identical to Case 4-A except that low-income individuals would not be
subsidized inside the benefit "hole."  CBO estimates that in 2004, federal costs would
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total $20.4 billion.  Nearly all of that savings comes from reductions in the cost of the
low-income subsidy.  Premiums would drop negligibly compared with Case 4-A.
Case 4-C extends the low-income subsidy to individuals with higher income than
those in previous cases.  Specifically, it includes all of the features of Case 4-A but
provides a full subsidy for premiums and cost sharing to enrollees who have income
at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level.  Enrollees with income between
150 percent and 175 percent of the poverty level would receive a premium subsidy
on a sliding scale.  Medicare costs would remain roughly unchanged compared with
Case 4-A, but the low-income subsidy would increase to $5.7 billion in 2004.
Increasing the federal subsidy for beneficiary premiums would substantially raise
program costs.  Case 4-D is identical to Case 4-A except that the subsidy is raised to
75 percent of premiums.  That change increases Medicare costs by 50 percent
compared with Case 4-A but reduces the cost of the low-income subsidy somewhat.
The net federal cost would rise to over $28 billion in 2004.  The sharp increase in
Medicare costs is mirrored by the sharp drop in premiums, which fall from about $17
billion in Case 4-A to about $8 billion in Case 4-D.
Because we have assumed throughout this discussion that the federal subsidy would
be at least 50 percent, the increase in Case 4-D does not yield an increase in
participation by Medicare enrollees.  However, if the federal subsidy declined below
50 percent, CBO assumes that enrollment would also decline somewhat.
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SUBSIDIES FOR LOW-INCOME ENROLLEES
Like the cases discussed above, all of the proposals put forward recently in the
Congress would require a substantial contribution by enrollees—through both cost
sharing and premiums.  To make a new drug benefit more affordable for low-income
Medicare beneficiaries, the proposals would at least partially subsidize those costs for
eligible enrollees.
Several decisions must be made in designing a low-income subsidy program for a
Medicare drug proposal.  Rules must be established to determine who would be
eligible for a subsidy and the amount.  Some low-income Medicare beneficiaries
currently receive assistance for some or all of their medical costs through Medicaid
and other state-run programs.  Most Medicare drug proposals have included
prescription assistance to low-income beneficiaries, keying it to the following
categories of Medicaid eligibility: 
 So-called dual eligibles meet all state requirements for Medicaid eligibility,
either because they are below the limits on income and assets set by the state
or because they have “spent down” their resources to those limits as a result
of high medical costs (the medically needy).  For the first group, their
Medicare cost sharing and premiums are paid by Medicaid.  They also receive
all Medicaid benefits, including coverage for  prescription drugs.  Most
medically needy enrollees receive those same benefits, although a few states
do not cover their expenses for drugs.
 Qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) have income below the federal
poverty level.  About 75 percent of that group qualify as dual eligibles; the
other 25 percent are eligible for benefits only as QMBs.  For the latter group,
Medicaid pays their cost sharing and premiums under Medicare, but they are
not eligible for other Medicaid benefits and they do not have Medicaid drug
coverage.    
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 Specified low-income Medicare beneficiaries (SLMBs) have income between
100 percent and 120 percent of the poverty level.  About a third of this group
qualify as dual eligibles.  The other two-thirds qualify only as SLMBs, and the
only Medicaid benefit they get is coverage for Medicare premiums.
In addition to beneficiaries currently qualifying for Medicaid coverage, other low-
income Medicare enrollees would also receive assistance under most recent Medicare
drug proposals.  Such plans would provide subsidies to all enrollees with income
below 135 percent of the poverty level (and within certain asset limits) to cover cost
sharing and premiums; they would pay some or all of the premiums for beneficiaries
with income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty level.  A few
proposals would extend the subsidy to enrollees with higher income.
A key design choice for low-income subsidies is how much of those costs would be
paid by the federal government and how much would be shared by the states.
Currently, the federal government pays 57 percent of Medicaid costs on average, with
the states paying the rest.  Most of the proposals for a Medicare drug benefit would
maintain the current federal contribution for dual eligibles and QMBs but allow full
federal funding for other low-income beneficiaries with income and assets at or
below the eligibility limits set specifically for the Medicare drug subsidy.  A proposal
that increased the federal government’s share of the cost of low-income subsidies
would reduce state costs.
The cost of low-income subsidies would also depend on how many people
participated in the program.  Not all eligible beneficiaries would choose to avail
themselves of the subsidies even if they participated in the drug benefit.  Some
beneficiaries would not want to be associated with a government "welfare" program;
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others might not believe that they were eligible or that they needed the subsidy.
Participation rates would vary according to the design of the proposal.
A further factor affecting participation is the entity designated to administer the
subsidy program.  Most recent proposals would rely on state Medicaid programs to
determine eligibility and to enroll low-income beneficiaries, but another option
would be to have the Social Security Administration (SSA) provide those
administrative services.  Participation would be higher under the latter arrangement
because there is less stigma associated with SSA than with Medicaid.
Another factor is the size of the subsidy:  a larger subsidy would probably induce
more people to participate in the program.  That effect would also depend on how the
benefit was designed.  High deductibles or premiums might persuade eligible low-
income beneficiaries to enroll in the low-income subsidy portion of the program to
cover those up-front costs.  That incentive to enroll would be stronger if the drug
benefit’s coverage of expenses beyond the deductible was more generous.
Perhaps the most significant issue affecting participation by low-income beneficiaries
is whether asset standards currently in place for Medicaid would be relaxed for the
drug benefit.  Less stringent asset standards would expand the number of people
eligible for subsidies.
With the introduction of a Medicare prescription drug benefit, there would be
offsetting changes in the federal government’s Medicaid spending.  On balance,
federal costs would increase when the effect of the low-income subsidy was
combined with those changes in Medicaid spending.  (Depending on how the subsidy
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was designed, states could also see a net increase in their costs.)  A Medicare drug
benefit would reduce Medicaid’s costs for current dual eligibles because Medicare
would pick up part of their prescription drug costs, in effect refinancing that portion
of the current Medicaid drug benefit.  However, some people who are now eligible
for assistance do not enroll in Medicaid.  A Medicare drug benefit would provide a
new incentive for those people to enroll in Medicaid, which under most proposals
would cover the drug benefit’s cost sharing and premiums. 
The magnitude of any increase in federal or state costs depends on the interplay
between the generosity of a Medicare drug benefit and its provisions for low-income
subsidies.  In general, for a given set of subsidy provisions, a less generous Medicare
drug benefit would lead to higher federal spending (the result of combining the
low-income subsidies and the effect on Medicaid).
CONCLUSION
While policymakers are well aware of Medicare's long-run financial problems, they
also know that its benefit package has deficiencies relative to the benefits typically
provided by private-sector insurance plans.  One such deficiency is that the program
provides only very limited coverage for outpatient prescription drugs—an
increasingly important component of modern medical care.  But adding a drug benefit
without other reforms would significantly increase Medicare's costs, and unless it was
fully financed by enrollees' premiums, it would greatly increase the already large
burden on the next generation of taxpayers.
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TABLE 1. CBO’S BASELINE PROJECTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
SPENDING AND MEDICARE BENEFITS PER ENROLLEE,
CALENDAR YEARS 2002-2011
Average Annual
Spending per Enrollee (Dollars) Percentage Change, 
2002 2011 2002-2011
Drug Spendinga 1,989 4,818 10.3
Medicare Benefitsb 6,841 11,268 5.7
Memorandum:
Gross Domestic Product per Capita 39,275 56,569 4.1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Total spending per enrollee on outpatient prescription drugs not currently covered under Medicare, regardless of payer.  Based on
CBO’s May 2001 baseline projections.
b. Medicare benefits per enrollee under the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance programs.  Based on CBO’s May
2001 baseline projections.
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TABLE 2. COMPARING CBO’S MAY 2001 AND MARCH 2000 BASELINE
PROJECTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING
(By calendar year, in billions of dollars)
Year
May 2001
Estimates
March 2000
Estimates
2001 70 66
2002 81 74
2003 92 82
2004 104 91
2005 117 101
2006 131 112
2007 148 124
2008 166 137
2009 186 152
2010 208 167
2011 236 n.a.
Total
2001-2010 1,302 1,105
2002-2011 1,467 n.a.
Memorandum:
Percentage increase in total spending, May 2001 estimates over March 2000 estimates, 
for 10 years ending in 2010 17.8
Percentage increase in total spending, 10 years ending in 2011 (using May 2001 estimates)
over 10 years ending in 2010 (using March 2000 estimates) 32.8
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
n.a. = not applicable.
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TABLE 3. PROJECTED SPENDING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
BY OR FOR MEDICARE ENROLLEES IN CALENDAR YEAR 2004
Spending Level
per Enrollee
(Dollars)
Spending by All
Enrollees At or 
Above the Level
(Billions of dollars)
Share of Enrollees
with Spending Above
the Level (Percent)
Share of Total
Drug Spending
(Percent)
0 103.7 87.6 100.0
1,000 72.3 59.2 69.7
2,000 50.5 40.9 48.7
3,000 35.5 28.2 34.2
4,000 25.2 19.1 24.3
5,000 18.1 13.4 17.5
6,000 13.2 9.1 12.7
7,000 9.9 6.4 9.5
8,000 7.4 4.6 7.2
9,000 5.7 3.4 5.5
10,000 4.4 2.4 4.3
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: Based on CBO’s May 2001 baseline projections.
Total Medicare enrollment for 2004 is projected to be 41.7 million people.
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TABLE 4. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE ENROLLEES, 
BY TYPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE, CALENDAR YEAR 1997
Number of Medicare Enrollees
(Thousands) Percentage of All Enrollees
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Supplemental Coverage 2,921 0 2,921 7.4 0 7.4
Any Medicaid Coveragea 690 6,257 6,947 1.7 15.7 17.5
Employer-Sponsored Plans 1,669 11,160 12,829 4.2 28.1 32.3
Individually Purchased Policies 5,734 4,530 10,264 14.4 11.4 25.8
Other Public Coverageb 0 1,396 1,396 0 3.5 3.5
HMOs Not Elsewhere Classifiedc      675   4,696   5,371   1.7  11.8   13.5
Total 11,689 28,039 39,728 29.4 70.6 100.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
NOTES: Some beneficiaries hold several types of coverage at once.  The categories in this table are mutually exclusive, and CBO assigned
people to groups in the order shown above.  The numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding.
HMO = health maintenance organization.
a. Comprises beneficiaries who received any Medicaid benefits during the year, including those eligible for a state’s full package of
benefits (so-called dual eligibles and those who meet eligibility requirements after paying their medical expenses) as well as others who
received assistance for Medicare premiums or cost sharing through the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary, Specified Low-Income Medicare
Beneficiary, and Qualifying Individual programs.
b. Beneficiaries who received aid for their drug spending through state-sponsored pharmacy assistance programs for low-income elderly
make up 60 percent of this category.  The remainder received prescription drug benefits through the Veterans Administration.
c. Primarily HMOs under Medicare+Choice risk contracts.
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TABLE 5. MEDICARE ENROLLEES AND THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG
COVERAGE AND SPENDING, BY POVERTY STATUS IN 1997 
Poverty
Statusa
Number of
Enrollees
(Millions)
Share of All
Enrollees
(Percent)
Share Within
Poverty Group
That Does Not
Have Drug
Coverage
(Percent)
Total Drug
Spending
(Billions of
dollars)
Out-of-Pocket
Drug Spending
(Billions of
dollars)
Less Than 100
Percent 6.3 15.9 24.2 5.9 1.7
100-200 Percent 11.2 28.1 37.2 10.0 5.0
200-300 Percent 8.4 21.2 29.8 7.8 3.8
300 Percent or
More  13.9   34.9 25.3   12.9   5.8
Total 39.7 100.0 29.4 36.7 16.2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).
NOTES: CBO adjusted each enrollee’s level of drug spending by 25 percent to reflect underreporting in the survey.  Prescription drug
spending for MCBS respondents who were in nursing homes was imputed from the expenditures of noninstitutionalized
respondents who have difficulties with the same number of activities of daily living.
The numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding.
a. Income relative to the federal poverty level.
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TABLE 6. OPTIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT THROUGH MEDICARE IN 2004
Case Descriptiona
Federal Cost
(Billions
of dollars)
Beneficiaries’
Monthly
Premium
(Dollars)
Base Federal government pays 50 percent of premiums; no deductible is
required; beneficiaries pay 50 percent coinsurance; stop-loss
protection is provided after $4,000 in out-of-pocket spending 30.9 56.80
Option 1: Change Beneficiaries’ Cost Sharing
1-A Require a $250 deductible 28.7 52.10
1-B Require a $500 deductible 26.9 48.10
1-C Reduce beneficiaries’ coinsurance to 25 percent 42.6 82.30
Option 2: Increase the Stop-Loss Amount
2-A Raise the stop-loss amount to $6,000 29.8 54.30
2-B Raise the stop-loss amount to $8,000 29.5 53.50
Option 3: Cap the Benefit
3 Cap the benefit after $2,500 in total drug spending; provide stop-loss
protection after $4,000 in out-of-pocket spending; subsidize low-
income beneficiaries’ spending in the “hole” 27.0 48.20
Option 4: Combinations
4-A Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in the “hole” 21.5 35.90
4-B Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; provide no subsidies for low-income beneficiaries’
spending in the “hole” 20.4 35.80
4-C Require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total drug
spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-pocket
spending; subsidize some or all cost sharing in the “hole” for
beneficiaries with income at or below 175 percent of the poverty
level 22.5 36.00
4-D Increase the share of premiums paid by the federal government to 75
percent; require a $250 deductible; cap benefits after $2,500 in total
drug spending; provide stop-loss protection after $6,000 in out-of-
pocket spending; subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in
the “hole” 28.4 18.00
SOURCE:  Congressional Budget Office.
a. The options represent changes relative to the base case.  The “hole” is the range of prescription drug spending above the benefit cap
and below the stop-loss amount.  To “subsidize low-income beneficiaries’ spending in the ‘hole,’” the federal government and the
states would provide aid in the following manner:  beneficiaries with income at or below 135 percent of the federal poverty level could
receive some or all cost sharing and premium assistance; and beneficiaries with income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the
poverty level could receive premium assistance on a sliding scale.
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TABLE 7. APPROXIMATE COST OF ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN CALENDAR YEAR 2004
(In billions of dollars)
Federal Cost to Taxpayers
Low-Income Payments by or 
Subsidies/ for Participating Beneficiaries
Other Medicare Medicare Cost
Casea Medicare Interactions Total Premiums Sharing Total
Base 26.5 4.3 30.9 26.5 44.5 71.0
1-A 24.3 4.4 28.7 24.3 48.2 72.5
1-B 22.5 4.4 26.9 22.5 51.4 73.9
1-C 38.4 4.1 42.6 38.4 24.5 63.0
2-A 25.3 4.4 29.8 25.3 46.6 72.0
2-B 25.0 4.5 29.5 25.0 47.3 72.3
3 22.5 4.5 27.0 22.5 51.6 74.1
4-A 16.8 4.7 21.5 16.8 61.8 78.5
4-B 16.7 3.6 20.4 16.7 61.6 78.3
4-C 16.8 5.7 22.5 16.8 61.8 78.6
4-D 25.2 3.2 28.4 8.4 61.8 70.1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: Estimates assume that all costs are phased in fully by 2004.  Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.  The table
differs from Table 5 in CBO’s March 27, 2001, testimony before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and
Means because it reflects CBO’s May 2001 baseline, corrections to estimates of cost sharing for participating beneficiaries, and
revised estimates of low-income subsidies and interactions with Medicaid.  The approximate level of total drug spending by or
for beneficiaries who participate in the new Medicare benefit is made up of the sum of Medicare’s net federal cost to taxpayers
and Medicare premiums and cost sharing paid by or for the enrollees.  Beneficiaries who chose not to participate in the new
Medicare benefit (in this case, those who enrolled in Part A but not Part B of Medicare) would also incur prescription drug
spending.
a. For descriptions of the illustrative cases, see Table 6.
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FIGURE 1. ANNUAL AVERAGE MEDICARE SPENDING GROWTH
FOR VARIOUS PERIODS
SOURCE: Historical data from the Health Care Financing Administration and projections by the Congressional Budget
Office.
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FIGURE 2.  PROJECTED MEDICARE OUTLAYS AND DEDICATED REVENUES
                  AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, CALENDAR YEARS 2000-2075
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SOURCE: Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (2001).
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FIGURE 3.  MEDICARE HI COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TAXABLE
                     EARNINGS, 2000-2075
SOURCE: Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (2001).
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FIGURE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF DRUG SPENDING FOR MEDICARE ENROLLEES,
BY PAYER, 1997
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office tabulations from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
NOTE: Drugs currently covered by Medicare are not included here.
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FIGURE 5.  POSSIBLE FEATURES OF A PRESCRIPTION DRUG INSURANCE BENEFIT
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
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